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Commutativity, comeasurability, and
contextuality in the Kochen-Specker arguments
Gábor Hofer-Szabó∗
Abstract
If noncontextuality is defined as the robustness of a system’s response to a mea-
surement against other simultaneous measurements, then the Kochen-Specker ar-
guments do not provide an algebraic proof for quantum contextuality. Namely, for
the argument to be effective, (i) each operator must be uniquely associated with a
measurement and (ii) commuting operators must represent simultaneous measure-
ments. However, in all Kochen-Specker arguments discussed in the literature either
(i) or (ii) is not met. Arguments meeting (i) contain at least one subset of mutually
commuting operators which do not represent simultaneous measurements and hence
fail to physically justify the functional composition principle. Arguments meeting
(ii) associate some operators with more than one measurement and hence need to
invoke an extra assumption different from noncontextuality.
Keywords: commutativity, comeasurability, contextuality, Kochen-Specker argu-
ment
1 Introduction: the main argument in brief
The aim of this paper is to challenge the view that Kochen-Specker (KS) arguments
provide an algebraic proof for quantum contextuality if noncontextuality is interpreted
as the robustness of a system’s response to a measurement against other simultaneous
measurements.
As a start, it is worth discerning KS arguments from KS theorems. KS theorems
are simply mathematical theorems in form of a coloring problem, while KS arguments
are physical arguments devised to prove that quantum mechanics (QM) is contextual.
The KS theorems start from a family of self-adjoint operators arranged on a hypergraph1
such that the subsets of mutually commuting operators define the hyperedges2 of the
∗Research Center for the Humanities, Budapest, email: szabo.gabor@btk.mta.hu
1A generalization of a graph where an edge can connect any number of vertices.
2A non-empty subset of vertices.
1
hypergraph.3 Two examples for such a hypergraph are the GHZ graph (on the left) and
the Peres-Mermin graph (on the right). Here each hyperedge is depicted by an unbroken
line connecting 4 collinear vertices on the GHZ graph and 3 collinear vertices on the Peres-
Mermin graph. Next, one introduces value assignments on the graph, that is, functions
assigning to each vertex one of the eigenvalues of the operators represented by the vertex
in every quantum state. Since the operators are typically projections or contractions,
the assignments generally yield the numbers 0, +1 and −1. The value assignments are,
however, constrained by the so-called functional composition principle4 (FUNC) requiring
that if the operators on a given hyperedge stand in a certain functional relation to one
another, then the values assigned to the operators should also stand in the same functional
relation in every quantum state.5 In the case of the GHZ graph, for example, the product
of the operators on every hyperedge is the unit operator +1ˆ, except for the horizontal
hyperedge, where the product is −1ˆ. In the case of the Peres-Mermin graph the product
of the operators on every hyperedge is +1ˆ, except for the third vertical hyperedge, where
it is −1ˆ. Since the eigenvalues of each operator on both graphs is ±1, FUNC allows
for only such value assignments for which the product of the assigned numbers on every
hyperedge equals the product of the operators (that is, +1 or −1) on that hyperedge. It
is easy to show that there is no such value assignment on the above two graphs. More
generally, KS theorems provide complex hypergraphs of operators such that there is no
value assignment on the graph respecting FUNC. Some KS theorems work only in specific
quantum states, others across all states. Thus, one can differentiate state-dependent and
state-independent (algebraic) KS theorems.
To proceed from a KS theorem to a KS argument, one needs to provide a physical
interpretation for the KS graph. To this aim, one first assumes that QM admits an
ontological (hidden variable) model. In other words, one assumes that the quantum states
are simply distributions of underlying (dispersion-free) ontic states. Next, one associates
the operators with observables and measurements. Measurements are “lists of instructions
to be implemented in the laboratory” (Spekkens, 2005, p. 2) and observables are physical
3See e.g. (Abramsky and Brandenburger, 2011), (Cabello et al. 2014), and (Acín et al., 2015).
4See (Redhead, 1989, p. 121) and (Held, 2018, Sec. 4).
5Alternatively: the values assigned to mutually commuting operators are the eigenvalues corresponding
to one of the common eigenstates of these operators.
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magnitudes which characterize a given quantum system. In a value-definite (deterministic)
ontological model each observable has a well-defined value in every ontic state. Each
observable is also associated with a measurement (procedure) such that the outcome of the
measurement reveals (faithfully) the value of the observable. Furthermore, each observable
A and the corresponding measurement a is represented by a self-adjoint operator aˆ such
that the values of the observable and the outcomes of the measurement are just the
eigenvalues of the operator. The exact nature of these associations will be examined
below. Finally, one interprets the quantum probability of an operator’s spectral projection
associated with a given eigenvalue as the probability of the corresponding observables
having the value associated with that eigenvalue, and also as the conditional probability
of the outcome associated with that value provided the corresponding measurement is
performed.
On this interpretation each value assignment on a KS graph represents a possible
distribution of values in a given ontic state which the observables associated with the
operators on the graph can take and which the corresponding measurements reveal. The
constraint FUNC is justified as follows. Mutually commuting operators on a hyperedge
have common eigenstates. If one prepares the system in one of these eigenstates, then the
functional relationship between the operators will be realized as the functional relationship
between the outcomes of the corresponding measurements, and also between the values of
the associated observables. Note that to justify FUNC in an eigenstate, the measurements
need not be comeasurable (simultaneously measurable). But what justifies FUNC in a
general quantum state? Here one can come up with three answers.
First, one can say that any ontic state featuring in the support of a general quantum
state must also show up in the support of at least one eigenstate.6 This answer, however,
is not very appealing. After all, why should every quantum state be composed of the
same ontic states as the eigenstates are?
Second, one can say that the mutually commuting operators {aˆi} of the graph rep-
resent simultaneous measurements {ai} and on performing these joint measurements one
can directly observe the functional relationship in question between the joint measurement
outcomes and hence (assuming faithful measurement) between the values of the observ-
ables. Note that simultaneous measurements are understood here in the very physical
sense, namely as measurements which can jointly be performed at the same time on the
same system. Also note that, although simultaneous measurements get represented in
QM by commuting operators, the converse is not true: from the mathematical fact that
certain measurements are represented by commuting operators it does not follow that
these measurements can be simultaneously performed. We come back to this important
point below.
Third, one can refer to the mathematical fact that for every set {aˆi} of mutually
commuting operators sitting on a hyperedge there is an operator bˆ and functions {fi}
6Maroney and Timpson (2014) call it “operational eigenstate support macrorealism.”
3
such that aˆi = fi(bˆ). Thus, one can say that there is only one single observable B with a
corresponding measurement b and the set {aˆi} of mutually commuting operators simply
represents the different functions {fi(B)} of this very observable. Consequently, FUNC
holds trivially: it simply expresses the functional relationship among the different func-
tions of the outcomes of b. Note that in this case the measurements {fi(b)} associated with
{aˆi} can be called “simultaneously measurable” only metaphorically since one performs
only one single measurement, namely b, and applies the functions to the outcome.
Now we show that these latter two justifications of FUNC lead to two different re-
alizations of a KS graph. To reduce metaphysics and to get closer to the experimental
testability, we eliminate the concept of observable from the discussion and adopt an op-
erational approach relying purely on operators and measurements. We call an association
of the operators of a KS graph with measurements a realization of the graph. A real-
ization is unique if each operator on the graph is associated with only one measurement
and non-unique if some operators are associated with more than one measurement. A
measurement associated with an operator is said to be realizing the operator. Now, in
the third justifications of FUNC above a set of operators {aˆi} sitting on a hyperedge is
realized by one single measurement b since the functions fi applied to the measurement b
are represented by aˆi. Call a realization hyperedge-based if there is at least one hyperedge
on the graph which is realized by (different functions of) one single measurement.
In a unique realization of the Peres-Mermin graph, for example, one has 9 different
measurements associated with the 9 vertices (operators) of the graph. In a (maximally)
hyperedge-based realization of the same graph one has only 6 measurements associated
with the 6 hyperedges (three rows or and three columns) of the graph. Can this latter
realization be unique? No, it cannot, as the following simple lemma shows:
Lemma. A hyperedge-based realization in which all sets of mutually commuting operators
represent simultaneous measurements cannot be unique.
Proof. Let aˆ1 be an operator sitting at the intersection of two hyperedges such that
all operators (among them aˆ1) on the one hyperedge are realized by a measurement
b. Suppose a contrario that aˆ1 is realized only by b. Now, since mutually commuting
operators represent simultaneous measurements, the measurements realizing the operators
on the other hyperedge must be comeasurable with at least one measurement realizing aˆ1.
But there is only one measurement realizing aˆ1, namely b. Therefore, the measurements
realizing the operators on the other hyperedge are comeasurable with b. But then all
operators on the two hyperedges either represent functions of b or measurements which
are comeasurable with b. Assuming that simultaneous measurements get represented
by commuting operators, this means that all operators on both hyperedges commute.
Contradiction. Consequently, aˆ1 cannot be realized only by b.
That is, a realization of a KS graph where all sets of mutually commuting operators are
realized by simultaneous measurements but some such sets by one single measurement
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cannot be unique. In other words, only the above second justification of FUNC can lead
to a unique realization, the third justification always leads to a non-unique realization.
To avoid the no-go result of the KS argument, unique and non-unique realizations
follow different strategies. On a unique realization one blocks the argument by assuming
that at least one measurement (associated with an operator sitting at the intersection of
two hyperedges) can have different outcomes in an ontic state depending on whether it
is simultaneously performed with measurements represented by operators on the one or
on the other hyperedge. On a non-unique realization, however, the argument can also be
blocked by assuming that different measurements represented by the same operator (at
the intersection of two hyperedges) can have different outcomes in a given ontic state.
These two strategies for avoiding the no-go result represent two different interpreta-
tions of (non)contextuality. On the first interpretation, noncontextuality is the indepen-
dence of the outcome of a measurement in every ontic state from which other measure-
ments it is simultaneously measured with. On the second interpretation noncontextuality
is a perfect correlation in every ontic state between the outcomes of two different measure-
ments represented by the same operator.7 Note that the two interpretations are different
and logically independent.
Historically, the first interpretation of noncontextuality goes back to Bell, the second
interpretation to Van Fraassen. Bell interprets noncontextuality as: the “measurement of
an observable must yield the same value independently of what other measurements may
be made simultaneously” (Bell, 1966/2004, p. 9). Van Fraassen’s contextuality, however,
is based on the insight that “[t]wo observables [a and b] are statistically equivalent if they
have the same probability distribution . . . In that case they are represented in physics by
the same Hermitean operator. . . . But that does not mean that a = b” (Van Fraassen,
1979, p. 158). In other words, two observables can be represented by the same self-adjoint
operator without being the same. But then, one is not forced to assign the same value to
them. Redhead (1989, p. 135) calls this fact ontological contextuality.
Many authors working in the operational approach (Spekkens, 2005; Hermens, 2011;
Leifer, 2014; etc.) follow this second interpretation. Spekkens, for example, writes: “A
noncontextual ontological model of an operational theory is one wherein if two experi-
mental procedures are operationally equivalent [that is, they are represented by the same
self-adjoint operator], then they have equivalent representations in the ontological model.”
(Spekkens, 2005, p. 1) There are also experiments devised to test noncontextuality in this
second sense (Mazurek, 2016). The general idea behind this understanding of noncontex-
tuality, once again, is that if two measurements—even if they are not simultaneous—are
represented by the same self-adjoint operator (which, as Van Fraassen rightly says, em-
pirically just means that the outcome statistics of the two measurement are the same),
then it is rational to assume that in every ontic state the outcomes (or more generally,
7Both definitions of noncontextuality can be generalized for probabilistic ontological models by replac-
ing “outcome” by “probability distribution of the outcomes.”
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the probability distributions of the outcomes) of the two measurements are also the same.
I don’t doubt that this is a reasonable requirement on an ontological model.8 I think,
however, that this requirement is more closely related to the special way in which QM
is representing the conditional probabilities and much less to the very concept of contex-
tuality. If outcomes of different measurements (defined via different “lists of laboratory
instructions”) are represented by the same projection, as happens in QM, then there might
indeed seem to be a need for the “context” to dismantle what was put together by the rep-
resentation. But this contextuality is simply the consequence of a special representation
which does not discriminate mathematically between that which is different physically,
namely the outcomes of different measurements. Had this difference been respected by
the representation, ontological contextuality would not arise.
If one relies, however, on the everyday usage of the term, then “context” refers simply
to the circumstances in which a certain event, observation or measurement occurs. These
circumstances are not constitutive in the definition of the very event or measurement, but
can significantly influence the occurrence of the event or the result of the measurement.
The important aspect of these circumstances, however, is that they are simultaneously
present with the event or measurement. A possible context for a measurement in physics
is another measurement which is performed simultaneously with the one in question.
(A non-simultaneous measurement cannot provide such a context since it lives in another
possible world.) In this sense noncontextuality refers to a kind of robustness of the definite
response to a measurement on a given system, with respect to simultaneous measurements
that are also performed on the system. I will refer to this kind of noncontextuality as
simultaneous noncontextuality. If we understand noncontextuality in this way, we just
arrive at the above first interpretation of noncontextuality.
I have no objection against using noncontextuality in the second sense as Spekkens
and many others use it. However, in this paper I will use noncontextuality exclusively in
the first sense (that is, as simultaneous noncontextuality) and refer to the second one as
Spekkens’ condition. My aim is to explore whether the KS arguments can prove that QM is
contextual in the first sense. The challenge is then to construct (i) a unique realization for
a KS graph, that is, to associate each operator of the graph with a different measurement
such that (ii) mutually commuting operators represent simultaneous measurements. We
stress that points (i) and (ii) are both important. Mutually commuting operators must
represent simultaneous measurements, otherwise FUNC, on which the whole KS theorem
is based, will not be physically justified. And the realization must be unique since non-
unique realizations realizing certain operators by more than one measurement need to
invoke noncontextuality in the second sense that is, Spekkens’ condition. By abandoning
Spekkens’ condition (that is, by allowing the system to respond differently to different
measurements represented by the same operator) one can always block the KS argument.
In short, simultaneous measurability and unique realization are both sine qua non in
8However, in Section 13, I show a simple classical ontological models in which this condition is violated.
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proving quantum contextuality.9
In the paper I will proceed as follows. First, I introduce the framework of operational
theories (Sect. 2) and ontological (hidden variable) models (Sect. 3); and define (simul-
taneous) noncontextuality (Sect. 4). Then, I accommodate QM in this framework (Sect.
5); pick a simple example, the Peres-Mermin square (Sect. 6); clarify what operational
theories would realize it (Sect. 7); and show that the standard spin measurement real-
ization does not do the job (Sect. 8). Next, I categorize KS argument into three types
(Sect. 9), investigate the GHZ argument as an argument of type II (Sect. 10); show
that arguments of type III can be effective only if they switch to non-unique realization
(Sect. 11) and if they assume Spekkens’ condition (Sect. 12). Using a simple toy model,
I compare Spekkens’ condition and noncontextuality (Sect. 13). Finally, I contrast the
KS arguments with the Bell-type arguments (Sect. 14).
2 Operational theories
An operational theory is a physical theory specifying the probability of the outcomes of
some measurements performed on a physical system prepared previously in certain states.
Let s, t, ... ∈ S be the possible states or preparations of the system under investigation. Let
a, b, ... ∈ M b be the basic measurements which can be performed on the system yielding
the outcomes Ai, Bj , ... (i ∈ I, j ∈ J, ...) respectively. Suppose that the measurements
are repeatable and we perform them many times and obtain stable long-run relative
frequencies for the outcomes in each state:
#(Ai ∧ a ∧ s)
#(a ∧ s)
,
#(Bj ∧ b ∧ r)
#(b ∧ r)
, . . .
These relative frequencies allow us to introduce the conditional probabilities of obtain-
ing certain outcomes given that the system has been prepared in certain states and the
appropriate measurements have been performed:
p(Ai|a ∧ s) , p(Bj |b ∧ r) , . . .
We call a state s ∈ S an eigenstate of the measurement a if
p(Ai|a ∧ s) ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ I (1)
If two measurements, say a and b, can be jointly or simultaneously performed, then
the joint frequencies
#(Ai ∧ Bj ∧ a ∧ b ∧ s)
#(a ∧ b ∧ s)
9Throughout the paper I will use the term “quantum contextuality” as the non-existence of a noncon-
textual value-definite ontological model for QM.
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are also well-defined which allows us to introduce the joint conditional probabilities:
p(Ai ∧ Bj |a ∧ b ∧ s)
Jointly or simultaneously performable measurements are also called comeasurable.
Whether two measurements are comeasurable is a physical question. One can measure
the width and the length of a table at the same time. But one cannot jointly check—using
Arthur Fine’s example—whether a given piece of wood is combustible and whether it can
float on water. The two measurements cannot be simultaneously performed; you cannot
burn the piece of wood while in water. Similarly, you are not going to burn the piece of
wood along with throwing it in water—unless you want to test whether the ash floats.
Let M denote the set of all measurements (basic and joint) physically performable on
a system and let the variables x, y range over the measurements in M . The outcomes of x
and y are denoted by Xk and Y l, (k ∈ Kx, l ∈ Ly), respectively, and the set of outcomes
of all measurements is denoted by O = ∪x{X
k}. Similarly, let the variable r range over
the preparations s, t, ... ∈ S of the system. An operational theory is then given by a set
of conditional probabilities of the outcomes for the various basic and joint measurements
in the various preparations:
p(Xk|x ∧ r) for all k ∈ Kx, x ∈M and r ∈ S (2)
which add up to 1 if we sum up for k.
Measurements which are not jointly measurable are not to be conflated with disturbing
measurements. Consider the following example. In the army one performs two tests:
shooting test (a) and tightrope walking (b). The two tests are jointly measurable; soldiers
can well walk on a thin rope and shoot in the meanwhile. However, their performance
in shooting is heavily influenced by whether they are walking on a rope or not while
shooting. Thus, two simultaneous measurements a and b are called non-disturbing if
p(Ai|a ∧ b ∧ r) = p(Ai|a ∧ r) for all i ∈ I and r ∈ S (3)
p(Bj |a ∧ b ∧ r) = p(Bj |b ∧ r) for all j ∈ J and r ∈ S (4)
For spacelike separated measurements no-disturbance is equivalent to no-signaling.
A non-disturbing operational theory can be characterized in the following compact
way. First note that there is a natural partial ordering on the measurements of an op-
erational theory which expresses “how joint” the measurements are. a ∧ b is “more joint”
than a or b. Call the set of basic measurements {a, b, ...} the basis of a measurement x,
if x = a ∧ b ∧ .... Now, for two measurements x, y ∈ M let x > y if the basis of x is
contained in or equal to the basis of y. Using this partial ordering, an operational theory
is non-disturbing if:
p(Xk|x ∧ r) = p(Xk|y ∧ r) for all k ∈ Kx, r ∈ S and x, y ∈M such that x > y (5)
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Denote by Mm the set of maximally joint measurements, that is, the set of measure-
ments x for which there is no other measurement y such that x > y. For a non-disturbing
operational theory it is enough to specify the conditional probabilities (2) for all x ∈ Mm;
all other conditional probabilities will then be set by (5).
3 Ontological models
The role of an ontological model10 (hidden variable model) is to account for the conditional
probabilities of an operational theory in terms of underlying realistic entities called ontic
states (hidden variables, elements of reality, beables). An ontological model defines the
preparations of the system in terms of distributions over the ontic states and specifies the
response of the system to the different measurements in the different ontic states in terms
of the so-called response functions. The ontological model is successful if the conditional
probabilities of the operational theory can be recovered in terms of these distributions
and response functions.
Mathematically, the provision of an ontological model starts with the specification the
set Λ of ontic states and a variable λ running over Λ. To make things simple we assume
that Λ is countable.11 Next, we associate with each preparation a probability distribution
over the ontic states:
p(λ|r) for all r ∈ S (6)
and to each measurement and ontic state a set of response functions that is, a set of
conditional probabilities
p(Xk|x ∧ λ) for all k ∈ Kx, x ∈M and λ ∈ Λ (7)
again with the obvious normalization.
One can also impose two natural screening-off conditions expressing the independence
of the preparations, measurements and ontic states. The first screening-off condition,
called no-conspiracy, requires that the probability distributions do not depend causally,
and hence probabilistically, on the measurements performed on the system:
p(λ|r) = p(λ|r ∧ x) for all x ∈M and r ∈ S (8)
The second screening-off condition, called λ-sufficiency, requires that the response func-
tions do not depend on the preparations in which the ontic states are featuring:
p(Xk|x ∧ λ) = p(Xk|x ∧ λ ∧ r) for all k ∈ Kx, x ∈ M, λ ∈ Λ and r ∈ S (9)
10Cf. Spekkens (2005).
11But nothing hinges on the cardinality of Λ.
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By means of (8)-(9) and using the theorem of total probability one obtains:
p(Xk|x ∧ r) =
∑
λ
p(Xk|x ∧ λ ∧ r) p(λ|r ∧ x)
=
∑
λ
p(Xk|x ∧ λ) p(λ|r) for all k ∈ Kx, x ∈M and r ∈ S (10)
That is, one recovers the operational theory from the ontological model in terms of the
probability distributions and response functions.
An ontic state λ with respect to a measurement x is called value-definite if
p(Xk|x ∧ λ) ∈ {0, 1} for all k ∈ Kx (11)
otherwise it is called probabilistic. Recall that one and same λ can be value-definite for
the one measurement and probabilistic for the other. An ontological model is called
value-definite if (11) holds for all x ∈Mm; otherwise it is called probabilistic.
4 Noncontextuality
Ontological models, both value-definite and probabilistic, trivially exist for an operational
theory if no further constraints are put on them. But now require that the ontological
model is noncontextual.
An ontological model is (simultaneous) noncontextual if every ontic state determines the
probability of the outcomes of every measurement independently of what other measure-
ments are simultaneously performed; otherwise is contextual.
(Simultaneous) noncontextuality can be formally expressed as follows:
p(Xk|x ∧ λ) = p(Xk|y ∧ λ) for all k ∈ Kx, λ ∈ Λ and x, y ∈M such that x > y(12)
In other words, each ontic state uniquely determines the probability of all outcomes of a
given measurement irrespective of what other measurements are co-measured. A specific
consequence of (12) is that the conditional probabilities of all basic measurements will be
fixed irrespective of what other measurements they are co-measured with.
Observe, that noncontextuality12 (12) is almost the same requirement as no-disturbance
(5), except that the latter is required for the preparations while the former is required
for the ontic states. Consequently, noncontextuality provides a neat explanation for why
an operational theory is non-disturbing: if an ontological model for an operational theory
satisfies noncontextuality (12) (and also no-conspiracy (8) and λ-sufficiency (9)), then the
12From now on, I drop the qualifier “simultaneous” but the term “noncontextuality” will continue to
mean “simultaneous noncontextuality” as defined in (12).
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operational theory will satisfy no-disturbance (5). Hence, the assumption of noncontex-
tuality is a kind of inference to the best explanation for the non-disturbing character of
an operational theory.
Some notes are in place here. (i) Noncontextuality (12) is a generalization of Shimony’s
(1986) parameter independence for situations when the simultaneous measurements are
not necessarily spacelike separated.
(ii) If a value-definite ontological model is noncontextual, then (11) will hold for all
x ∈M (and not just for x ∈Mm).
(iii) Noncontextuality of an ontological model does not generally imply factorization:
p(Xk ∧ Y l|x ∧ y ∧ λ) = p(Xk|x ∧ λ) p(Y l|y ∧ λ) for all k ∈ Kx, l ∈ Ly, λ ∈ Λ
and x, y, x ∧ y ∈M (13)
But it does if the ontological model is value-definite.
(iv) Noncontextuality as defined in (12) resembles to the concept of noncontextuality
of Simon et al. (2001) but differs from that of Spekkens (2005) and other operationalists.
Below I will refer to this latter concept as “Spekkens’ condition.”
5 Quantum mechanical representation
On the minimal interpretation QM is an operational theory which provides conditional
probabilities for the outcomes of different measurements in different states. Thus, the
empirical content of QM could be expressed simply by listing the various conditional
probabilities. However, in the standard formalism these conditional probabilities get
represented in a linear algebraic fashion. The physical system is associated with a Hilbert
space; each state r ∈ S is represented by a density operator ρˆr; each measurement x ∈M
by a self-adjoint operator xˆ; and the outcomeXk of x by the orthogonal spectral projection
Pˆ
k
x of xˆ with eigenvalue X
k. The representation is connected to experience by the Born
rule:
Tr(ρˆrPˆ
k
x) = p(X
k|x ∧ r) for all k ∈ Kx, x ∈M and r ∈ S (14)
where Tr is the trace function.
Now, if a and b are comeasurable, then a ∧ b gets represented in QM by commuting
operators aˆ and bˆ. But if aˆ and bˆ are commuting, then a and b will turn out to be
non-disturbing:
p(Ai|a ∧ b ∧ r) =
∑
j
p(Ai ∧Bj |a ∧ b ∧ r) =
∑
j
Tr(ρˆrPˆ
i
aPˆ
j
b) = Tr(ρˆrPˆ
i
a) = p(A
i|a ∧ r) for all i ∈ I and r ∈ S
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and similarly for p(Bj|a ∧ b ∧ r). Thus, the quantum mechanical representation of joint
measurements implies that QM cannot represent comeasurable but disturbing measure-
ments. In other words, only non-disturbing operational theories can have a quantum
mechanical representation.
Being an operational theory, one can search for an ontological model for QM. The
KS arguments are intending to rule out such an ontological model if it is both value-
definite and noncontextual.13 In the following sections I pick a special KS theorem, the
Peres-Mermin square (Peres, 1990; Mermin, 1992) and investigate whether it can be
given a unique realization, that is, an operational theory composed of 9 simultaneous
measurements which does not admit a value-definite, noncontextual ontological model.
6 An example: the Peres-Mermin square
Consider the following 3×3 matrix of self-adjoint operators:
aˆ ≡ σˆ3 ⊗ 1ˆ bˆ ≡ 1ˆ⊗ σˆ3 cˆ ≡ σˆ3 ⊗ σˆ3
dˆ ≡ 1ˆ⊗ σˆ1 eˆ ≡ σˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆ fˆ ≡ σˆ1 ⊗ σˆ1
gˆ ≡ σˆ3 ⊗ σˆ1 hˆ ≡ σˆ1 ⊗ σˆ3 iˆ ≡ σˆ2 ⊗ σˆ2
where σˆ1, σˆ2 and σˆ3 are the Pauli operators and 1ˆ is the unit operator on the two
dimensional complex Hilbert space. The operators in the matrix are arranged in such
a way that two operators are commuting if and only if they are in the same row or in
the same column. Each operator in the matrix has two eigenvalues, ±1. Denote the
spectral projections of the operators aˆ, bˆ, cˆ, ... associated with the eigenvalues ±1 by
Pˆ
±
a , Pˆ
±
b , Pˆ
±
c , ..., respectively. Let the variables xˆ, yˆ, and zˆ range over the operators of
the Peres-Mermin square. Denote the spectral projections of xˆ, yˆ, and zˆ by Pˆ
j
x, Pˆ
k
y , and
Pˆ
l
z (j, k, l = ±1), respectively. The set of states S is represented by the set of density
operators on the two dimensional complex Hilbert space (which also include the common
eigenstates for each subset of mutually commuting operators).
The quantum probabilities for the spectral projections of the three vertical and three
horizontal commuting triples of operators are given by the trace formula:
Tr(ρˆrPˆ
±
x Pˆ
±
y Pˆ
±
z ) for all ρr density operators (15)
Now, it turns out that these quantum probabilities are non-zero only for certain combi-
nations of spectral projections for a given commuting triple (irrespective of the quantum
13The restriction to value-definiteness is dropped in certain arguments (Mazurek et al. 2016), but here
noncontextuality is defined as measurement noncontextuality á la Spekkens (2005) and not as (12).
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state). More specifically, for the third vertical triple ({cˆ, fˆ , iˆ}) the quantum probabili-
ties are non-zero only for those combinations of projections for which the product of the
associated eigenvalues is −1. For the other five triples this product must be +1. That is,
Tr(ρˆrPˆ
j
xPˆ
k
yPˆ
l
z) 6= 0 only if
{
j · k · l = −1 if {xˆ, yˆ, zˆ} = {cˆ, fˆ , iˆ}
j · k · l = +1 otherwise
(16)
Note that these admissible combinations of eigenvalues are also associated with the four
common eigenstates of the triplet in question.
Now, these admissible combinations of eigenvalues provide a constraint on the value
assignments that is, on the functions sending each of the nine operators of the Peres-
Mermin square to one of their eigenvalues, that is, to ±1. The constraint is that the
product of the numbers in each row and column should be +1, except for the third
column where it should be −1. It is easy to see that no such value assignment exists.
But does this no-go result prove that QM does not admit a noncontextual value-
definite ontological model? Not until the Peres-Mermin square is given a unique physical
realization.
7 An operational theory realizing the Peres-Mermin
square
Consider an operational theory with 9 basic measurements:
a b c
d e f
g h i
The 3×3matrix in which the measurements are arranged is to express now comeasurability
relations: measurements are simultaneously measurable if and only if they are in the same
row or in the same column.
Each measurement can have two outcomes, A±, B±, C±, ... = ±1. Let the variables
x, y and z range over the basic measurements M b. Denote the outcomes of x, y and z
by Xj, Y k and Z l (j, k, l = ±1), respectively. Let the conditional probability of the 6
different maximally joint measurements be:
p(X± ∧ Y ± ∧ Z± | x ∧ y ∧ z ∧ r) for all r ∈ S (17)
Suppose furthermore that the condition probabilities of all other non-maximally joint
measurements can be obtained from (17) by marginalization. Thus, (17) characterizes a
non-disturbing operational theory.
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Now, suppose that the operational theory (17) is a physical realization of the Peres-
Mermin square in the sense that the quantum probabilities (15) in the Peres-Mermin
square represent just the conditional probabilities (17) via the Born rule (14). That is,
Tr(ρˆrPˆ
j
xPˆ
k
yPˆ
l
z) = p(X
j ∧ Y k ∧ Z l|x ∧ y ∧ z ∧ r) for all r ∈ S (18)
Note that (18) is well-defined since the operators on the left hand side are mutually
commuting if and only if the represented measurements on the right hand side are comea-
surable. Also note that the operational theory (17) is a unique realization of the Peres-
Mermin square, since every operator is associated with a different measurement. As we
saw in the Introduction, only unique realizations can decide on the status of noncontex-
tuality in QM. (In Section 11 we will see what non-unique realizations can do.)
From (16) and (18) it follows that the support of the probability distributions over
the outcomes that is, the set of possible outcomes for each maximally joint measurement
x ∧ y ∧ z and each preparation r ∈ S is the following:
p(Xj ∧ Y k ∧ Z l | x ∧ y ∧ z ∧ r) 6= 0 only if
{
j · k · l = −1 if {x, y, z} = {c, f, i}
j · k · l = +1 otherwise
(19)
that is, the conditional probability is non-zero only for such joint outcomes which contain
an odd number of +1s and an even number of −1s in each row and column, except for
the last column where the number of +1s is even and the number of −1s is odd.
Does the operational theory (17) have a noncontextual value-definite ontological model?
Assume (contrary to fact) that there is such a model with response functions:14
p(X± ∧ Y ± ∧ Z± | x ∧ y ∧ z ∧ λ) for all λ ∈ Λ (20)
Being noncontextual and value-definite, the response functions are factorizing:
p(X± ∧ Y ± ∧ Z± | x ∧ y ∧ z ∧ λ) = p(X± | x ∧ λ) p(Y ± | y ∧ λ) p(Z± | z ∧ λ) (21)
for all λ ∈ Λ. Thus, the ontological model can be characterized by the extremal conditional
probabilities:
p(X± | x ∧ λ) ∈ {0, 1} for all x ∈M b and λ ∈ Λ (22)
However, the support (19) of the operational theory restricts the possible extremal
conditional probabilities. Namely, for any three simultaneous measurements x, y and z
in M b and λ ∈ Λ one requires that
p(Xj | x ∧ λ) p(Y k | y ∧ λ) p(Z l | z ∧ λ) = 1 only if
{
j · k · l = −1 if {x, y, z} = {c, f, i}
j · k · l = +1 otherwise
(23)
14Note that for this argument we don’t need the probability distributions p(λ|r).
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otherwise there could be some ontic states which, if prepared (that is, p(λ|r) 6= 0 for some
r ∈ S), would render at least one conditional probability in (17) non-zero outside the
support (19).
However, it is easy to see that there is no such a set of conditional probabilities (22)
which satisfies (23). This is due to the impossibility to fill in a 3×3 matrix with ±1s such
that the product of the numbers in each row and column is +1, except for the last column
where it is −1. Consequently, the operational theory (17) does not have a noncontextual
value-definite ontological model.
Let me briefly reflect on the question of experimental testability of the above operational
theory. Suppose that in a real experiment the support equation (19) cannot be sharply
validated but only up to a fraction 1 − ǫ of all runs. How small ǫ should be so that
a noncontextual value-definite ontological model for the operational theory can still be
ruled out?
Suppose a contrario that the ontological model is noncontextual and it conforms to
the measurement statistics as much as possible, that is, for all λ ∈ Λ only one of the six
constraints (23) is violated. (For example some λ assigns +1 to all 9 measurements, vio-
lating thus the constraint of the third column but respecting all the other five, etc.) Since
there are six different triply joint measurements (of the three rows and three columns),
hence—modulo some conspiracy—there is a 1/6 probability for any λ that a certain joint
measurement will pick just that triple for which (23) is violated. Since each such measure-
ment will contribute to the violation of (19), (19) will be violated in a fraction of 1/6 of
all runs. Consequently, if in a real experiment ǫ is smaller than 1/6, then the experiment
will rule out a noncontextual value-definite ontological model for the operational theory.
This argument is a special case of a general argument provided by Simon et al. (2001)
and Larsson (2002) in the defense of the KS arguments against the so-called finite pre-
cision loophole argument of Meyer (1999), and Clifton and Kent (2000). As Barrett and
Kent (2004, Section 4.3) nicely point out, the finite precision loophole is effective only if
noncontextuality is defined in terms of operators on a Hilbert space and not operationally
in terms of measurements—in short, only if KS arguments are understood as KS theorems.
Thus, the finite precision loophole arguments do not nullify the KS arguments based on
the above operational theory.
8 Do spin measurements realize the Peres-Mermin square?
The only question that remains is thus whether there exists an operational theory physi-
cally realizing the Peres-Mermin square?
The first idea that comes to mind is the standard spin measurements. Suppose that
the operator σˆi ⊗ σˆj (i, j = 1, 2, 3) represents the measurement that first we perform
two spin measurements by two Stern-Gerlach magnets on a pair of spin-1
2
particles in
directions ~i and ~j, respectively (~i,~j ∈ {~x, ~y, ~z}; ~x, ~y and ~z are mutually perpendicular);
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and second we check whether the outcomes of the measurements on the opposite wings
are the same (+1) or not (−1). Denote this composite measurement, symbolically, by
(si ∧ sj)
±. Furthermore, let σˆi ⊗ 1ˆ (i = 1, 2, 3) and 1ˆ⊗ σˆj (j = 1, 2, 3) represent that we
perform the spin measurement only on the left and right particle, respectively. Denote
these singular spin measurements, symbolically, by si ∧ 1 and 1 ∧ sj, respectively. Then,
the measurements realizing uniquely the Peres-Mermin square read as follows:
a ≡ s3 ∧ 1 b ≡ 1 ∧ s3 c ≡ (s3 ∧ s3)
±
d ≡ 1 ∧ s1 e ≡ s1 ∧ 1 f ≡ (s1 ∧ s1)
±
g ≡ (s3 ∧ s1)
± h ≡ (s1 ∧ s3)
± i ≡ (s2 ∧ s2)
±
Unfortunately, however, only four of the six commuting subsets of operators represent
simultaneous measurements: the first two rows and the first two columns. Measurements
in the third row and in the third column are, however, not comeasurable. For example,
the measurements c, f and i in the third column, that is, the spin measurements in
directions ~z−~z, ~x−~x, and ~y−~y cannot be simultaneously performed: one cannot turn the
Stern-Gerlach magnets in directions ~z−~z, ~x−~x, and ~y−~y at the same time. Consequently,
although the left hand side of (18) exists, the right hand side is ill-defined for the third
column and also for the third row. The quantum probabilities
Tr(ρˆr Pˆ
±
c Pˆ
±
f Pˆ
±
i )
Tr(ρˆr Pˆ
±
g Pˆ
±
h Pˆ
±
i )
cannot be interpreted as conditional probabilities
p(C± ∧ F± ∧ I± | c ∧ f ∧ i ∧ r)
p(G± ∧H± ∧ I± | g ∧ h ∧ i ∧ r)
and hence neither their support is defined. So one does not have the constraint
p(C i | c ∧ λ) p(F j | f ∧ λ) p(Ik | i ∧ λ) = 1 only if j · k · l = −1 (24)
p(Gi | c ∧ λ) p(Hj | f ∧ λ) p(Ik | i ∧ λ) = 1 only if j · k · l = 1 (25)
for the ontic states in the third column and third row and hence cannot arrive at the
contradiction outlined above. The whole argumentation collapses. In short, the standard
spin measurement does not realize the Peres-Mermin square in form of an operational
theory (17), and consequently does not provide a physical realization for a quantum
mechanical scenario for which a noncontextual value-definite ontological model could be
ruled out.
Obviously, the standard realization of the above operators in terms of spin measure-
ments is not the only possible physical realization. One may well come up with another
16
unique realization on which the measurements are comeasurable if and only if the rep-
resenting operators are commuting. However, I know of no such realization. And the
burden of proof is on those who claim that the above arrangement of operators exclude
a noncontextual value-definite ontological model for QM. An uninterpreted formalism
cannot prove anything about the outer world.15
Perhaps it is worth reflecting for a moment on the relation of commutativity and comeasur-
ability (see Park and Margenau, 1968). Comeasurability is used in two different meanings
in quantum physics. First, two measurements are called comeasurable (compatible, si-
multaneously measurable) if, performing them one after another, the first measurement
does not alter the outcome statistics of the second one. Obviously, this usage of the term
“simultaneous” is metaphoric and has no bearing on the KS arguments.
The other meaning is the one we use throughout this paper: two measurement are
comeasurable if they can physically be performed at the same time on the same system.
Note, however, that this notion of comeasurability and the notion of commutativity are
not synonym expressions. From the simple fact that two measurements are represented
by commuting operators it does not follow that the measurements are simultaneously
performable. Comeasurability is a physical question which cannot be simply read off
from their representation. Simultaneous measurements get represented in QM by com-
muting operators. But the converse is not true. Not all commuting operators represent
simultaneous measurements. Consider the following three pairs of commuting operators:
[
Sˆ
2
1
, Sˆ
2
2
]
= 0
[σˆ1 ⊗ σˆ3 , σˆ3 ⊗ σˆ1] = 0
[σˆ1 ⊗ σˆ1 ⊗ σˆ1 , σˆ2 ⊗ σˆ2 ⊗ σˆ1] = 0
where Sˆ1, Sˆ2 and σˆ1, σˆ2 are spin-1 and spin-
1
2
operators, respectively. Each pair is fea-
turing in one or other of a renowned KS argument: the first pair in the original Kochen-
Specker (1967) argument; the second in Peres’ (1990) and Mermin’s (1992) version and
also in Cabello’s (1997) version; and the third in the GHZ (1989) version of the argu-
ment. However, none of them can be interpreted as operators representing simultaneous
spin measurements on pairs or triples of spin-1 or spin-1
2
particles. But in the absence
of a unique realization of a KS graph where commuting operators represent simultaneous
measurements, the no-go results do not prove that QM does not admit a noncontextual
value-definite ontological model.
How then the above KS arguments work?
15But one might respond: why not to measure c, f and i simultaneously by one single “global” mea-
surement (Reck et al., 1994)? We return to this question in Section 11.
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9 Three types of Kochen-Specker arguments
To see the problem more clearly, it is worth introducing the following categorization. Sup-
pose we are given a unique realization, that is, a KS graph and an associated operational
theory realizing the operators on the graph in a one-to-one manner. Now, one can cast the
KS arguments into three types according to the number of subsets of mutually commuting
operators (operators on a hyperedge) which do not represent simultaneous measurements
in the associated operational theory:
Arguments of type I: where all commuting subsets represent simultaneous measure-
ments;
Arguments of type II: where all but one commuting subset represent simultaneous
measurements;
Arguments of type III: where there is more than one commuting subset not repre-
senting simultaneous measurements.
As it will turn out soon, there is a huge difference in the efficacy of the three types of
arguments.
It is only KS arguments of type I which provide a state-independent (algebraic) proof
for quantum contextuality, since for these arguments FUNC can be physically justified
by the probability distribution of the joint outcomes of simultaneous measurements. Un-
fortunately, I am not aware of any argument of type I. In other words, I am not aware
of any unique realization of any KS graph where all commuting subsets of operators
would represent simultaneous measurements. Consequently, I am also not aware of any
state-independent argument proving quantum contextuality.
KS arguments of type II do exist but they provide only a state-dependent proof for
quantum contextuality. An example for such an arguments is the GHZ argument. I return
to this argument in the next section.
Finally, KS arguments of type III abound. The Peres-Mermin square with the stan-
dard spin realization is one example: the number of commuting subsets not representing
simultaneous measurements is two, the three operators in the third row and the three
operators in the third column. Another example for arguments of type III is the original
KS graph with 117 vertices with the standard spin realization. Here none of the commut-
ing subsets represents simultaneous measurements since the spin measurements for three
orthogonal directions cannot be simultaneously performed. In section 11, I will argue
that arguments of type III are inconclusive in proving quantum contextuality. To get a
contradiction, they need to flip to a non-unique (hyperedge-based) realization and invoke
Spekkens’ condition. However, by abandoning Spekkens’ condition the contradiction can
be avoided.
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10 Kochen-Specker arguments of type II
Let us see first the KS arguments of type II. A prototype of such arguments is the GHZ
argument. The GHZ graph (pentagram) reads as follows:
σˆ2 ⊗ 1ˆ⊗ 1ˆ
σˆ1 ⊗ σˆ1 ⊗ σˆ1 σˆ2 ⊗ σˆ2 ⊗ σˆ1 σˆ2 ⊗ σˆ1 ⊗ σˆ2 σˆ1 ⊗ σˆ2 ⊗ σˆ2
1ˆ⊗ 1ˆ⊗ σˆ1 1ˆ⊗ 1ˆ⊗ σˆ2
σˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆ⊗ 1ˆ
1ˆ⊗ σˆ2 ⊗ 1ˆ 1ˆ⊗ σˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆ
On the standard spin realization of the GHZ graph, all but one subsets of the mutu-
ally commuting operators can be interpreted as representing simultaneous measurements.
Measurements represented by commuting operators on four of the five edges of the GHZ
pentagram are comeasurable since they are performed on three spacelike separated sub-
systems. But the measurements represented by the operators on the fifth, horizontal edge
are not comeasurable.
How does then the KS argument work in the GHZ case?
The trick to circumvent the problem of non-comeasurability is to prepare the system
in one of the common eigenstates of the measurements on the horizontal edge.16 The
outcome for each measurement on the horizontal edge will then be fixed even if the
measurements are not comeasurable. The product of the possible outcomes of the four
different measurements will turn out to be −1 in each common eigenstate. Now, the
measurements on the other four lines of the GHZ pentagram are comeasurable, and the
product of their possible joint outcomes in all states (among them in the above common
eigenstates) will be +1. This means that each ontic state in the support of these common
eigenstates needs to assigns ±1 to the individual measurements such that the product
of these numbers is +1 in each line, except in the horizontal line where it is −1. Such
value assignment, however, is impossible, which rules out a noncontextual value-definite
ontological model for the GHZ scenario.
More generally, KS arguments of type II where all but one set of commuting operators
represent simultaneous measurements are all state-dependent arguments. One needs to
prepare the system in one of the common eigenstates of the non-comeasurable measure-
ments to “compensate” the failure of comeasurability of these measurements. By doing
16See (1) for how an eigenstate for a measurement is defined.
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so one obtains the same constraint on the response functions (necessary for deriving the
contradiction) as one would obtain if the measurements were comeasurable. But note
that these argument of type II cannot be transformed into a state-independent argument.
They work only if the system is prepared in one of the common eigenstates of the operators
representing non-comeasurable measurements.
11 Kochen-Specker arguments of type III
Finally, let us turn to the KS arguments of type III that is, to arguments where there is
more than one commuting subset not representing simultaneous measurements. Here the
strategy outlined in the previous section does not work. Even if one prepares the system in
a common eigenstate of a set of operators representing non-comeasurable measurements,
there remains at least one other set of non-comeasurable measurements for which the joint
outcomes are not known. This blocks the KS argument since the constraint on the ontic
state coming from this very set of measurements will be missing.
One might however raise the question: Why not simply replace a commuting subset not
representing simultaneous measurements by one single measurement and apply certain
functions on the result? Then the comeasurability problem would be solved.
Well, it is indeed a mathematical fact that for any finite set {aˆi} of mutually commut-
ing operators there exists an operator bˆ and a set of functions {fi} such that aˆi = fi(bˆ)
(Halmos, 1958). Note, however, that from this mathematical fact it does not follow that
there also is a physical measurement b represented by the operator bˆ. The existence of
such a measurement is a physical question which does not automatically follow from the
existence of the operator bˆ.
But now suppose that in a KS argument of type III we replace every subset of non-
comeasurable measurements {ai} realizing {aˆi} by one single measurement b such that
the functions {fi(b)} also realize {aˆi}. Will it turn the argument of type III into an
argument of type I?
No, it will not. Replacing non-comeasurable measurements by functions of one single
measurement renders the realization hyperedge-based. But then we face the following
problem: To test noncontextuality, we need to provide a unique realization of the KS graph
and guarantee that all subsets of mutually commuting operators represent simultaneous
measurements. However, as Lemma in the Introduction shows, such a realization cannot
be hyperedge-based. So we need to give up the uniqueness of the realization, that is,
we need to associate at least one operator with more than one measurement. These
measurements will be physically different but will be represented by the same operator.
Operationally this means that they have the same distribution of outcomes in every
quantum state. To get the no-go result, however, one needs to assume more: namely
that they have the same distribution of outcomes in every ontic state, or in other words,
they have the same set of response functions. This assumption, however, is an extra
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assumption, different from noncontextuality. By abandoned it the KS argument can be
blocked.
To sum up, KS arguments of type III do not prove quantum contextuality since FUNC
cannot be physically justified for at least one set mutually commuting operators in the
argument. Replacing non-comeasurable measurements by functions of one single mea-
surement does not solve the problem either since either we stick to unique realization
but then some hyperedges will not represent simultaneous measurements; or we switch to
non-unique realization but then we need to use an extra assumption in the argument. To
this assumption we turn in the next section.
12 Spekkens’ condition
Rob Spekkens (2005) introduced a constraint on ontological models and called it measure-
ment noncontextuality.17 He took it to be a generalization of the quantum mechanical
noncontextuality for operational theories. I share Spekkens’ view that his requirement
plays an important role in the KS arguments but, as explained in the Introduction, I con-
test that it expresses noncontextuality.18 Hence, I will refer to Spekkens’ noncontextuality
simply as Spekkens’ condition:
If the probability of an outcome of a measurement is the same as the probability of an
outcome of another measurement in every preparation, then the probability of the outcomes
for the two measurements should also be the same in all ontic states.
Formally, if for some x, y ∈M , k ∈ Kx, and l ∈ Ly
p(Xk|x ∧ r) = p(Y l|y ∧ r) for all r ∈ S (26)
then
p(Xk|x ∧ λ) = p(Y l|y ∧ λ) for all λ ∈ Λ (27)
Now, Spekkens’ condition gives rise to a line of counterfactual reasoning. If we measure
x in a certain run of the experiment and obtain the outcome Xk, then, if the ontological
model is value-definite with respect to x and y, we can conclude based upon Spekkens’
condition that had we measured y, we would have obtained Y l. But note that Spekkens’
condition is not an assumption about possible worlds but a restriction on the ontological
models for an operational theory.
Spekkens’ condition, similarly to noncontextuality (12), is also a kind of inference to
the best explanation: if (27) and also no-conspiracy (8) and λ-sufficiency (9) hold for an
17See also (Liang et al., 2011), (Leifer, 2014) and (Krishna et al., 2017).
18For a criticism of Spekkens operational definition of measurement noncontextuality—based on a
criticism of operationalism—see (Hermens 2011).
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ontological model, then we obtain a neat explanation why (26) holds. The explanandum
in the case of noncontextuality is no-disturbance, in the case of Spekkens’ condition it is
the statistical match between outcomes of different measurements.
Note that Spekkens’ condition (26)-(27) is logically independent from contextuality
(12). Spekkens’ condition does not rely on simultaneous measurability, while contextual-
ity does. If there are no simultaneous measurements in an operational theory, then each
ontological model will be noncontextual since (12) is fulfilled vacuously. Still, the model
can violate Spekkens’ condition (26)-(27) if there are measurements yielding certain out-
comes with the same probability in every state and differing in their response functions.
Conversely, if premise (26) is not satisfied in an operational theory, then Spekkens’ con-
dition is fulfilled vacuously. But if the theory is disturbing, the ontological model can
still be contextual. In a non-disturbing operational theory, however, (26) holds for all x
and y such that x > y. Consequently, if Spekkens’ condition holds, noncontextuality will
also hold. In short, in a non-disturbing operational theory (like QM) Spekkens’ condition
implies noncontextuality.
It is instructive to see what an ontological model which violates Spekkens’ condition
look like. If (26) holds in an operational theory but (27) does not, then the distributions
of ontic states representing the preparations cannot be arbitrary. Thus the violation of
Spekkens’ condition puts a constraint on the possible distributions of ontic states: one
cannot pick arbitrarily from ontic states when preparing the system. Preparations must
be composed from the underlying ontic states according to a certain pattern which is
sensitive to how the ontic states respond to certain measurements. But note that it is not
an a priori truth that any probability distribution of ontic states represents a physically
possible preparation. There may well be many physical reasons which restrict the possible
preparations of a system and Spekkens’ condition is only one among those.
As we saw in the previous section, Spekkens’ condition plays a crucial role in non-
unique KS arguments. In these arguments certain operators of the KS graph will be
realized by two different measurements. The two different measurements, however—
being represented by the same operator—will have the same outcome statistics. But this
is exactly the antecedent (26) of Spekkens’ condition. The role of Spekkens’ condition is
to ensure the consequent (27), that is, to ensure that the response functions of the two
different measurements are perfectly correlated. By this assumption the no-go result can
be derived. Thus, non-unique KS arguments heavily rely on Spekkens’ condition.19
19There are exceptions, however. In certain KS arguments the constraint (27) is not obtained via
Spekkens’ condition but through some other (often counterfactual) reasonings. In Lapkiewicz et al.
(2011), for example, an experiment is devised to prove the violation of the Klyachko-Can-Binicioğlu-
Shumovsky inequality (2008). To get the conclusion (“to close the pentagram”), however, the authors
needed to assume that the response of system on two not simultaneous measurements (A1 and A
′
1
in the
paper) are perfectly correlated. This is just a constraint of type (27).
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13 A simple toy model
Before concluding, it is worth reflecting once more on the difference between noncontextu-
ality and Spekkens’ condition (the first and second interpretations of noncontextuality, as
we called them in the Introduction) and illustrating this difference on a simple toy model.
Suppose we fill a box with balls and perform two sorts of basic measurements: we pull
a ball from the box and check its color or its size. The possible outcomes for the color
measurement are black and white; for the size measurement the outcomes are big and
small. Repeating the measurement many times we get long-run relative frequencies for
the various measurement outcomes. The two measurements are comeasurable, hence also
the probability distribution over the joint outcomes can be determined. Suppose further-
more that our operational theory is (i) non-disturbing and (ii) it satisfies the antecedent
of the Spekkens’ condition: for every preparation, that is, for every filling up the box with
balls, the probability of pulling a black ball upon color measurement is the same as the
probability of pulling a big ball upon size measurement.
We would like to construct an ontological model for our operational theory. The
model is noncontextual if, given an ontic state, the probability of all four measurement
outcomes is independent of whether we produce it by a basic or a joint measurement.
The model satisfies Spekkens’ condition if, given an ontic state, the probability of the
outcome black/white upon color measurement is the same as the probability of the out-
come big/small upon size measurement.
An ontological model which is both noncontextual and also satisfies Spekkens’ condi-
tion is the following: there are just two types of balls in the box: one type is black and
big, the other type is white and small. Upon measuring the color of the first type of ball
we get invariable the outcome black independently of whether we co-measure the size or
not (and similarly for the other outcomes). This model neatly explains the above two
probabilistic facts, (i) and (ii), of the operational theory.
But there are ontological models in which one of the two requirements is violated.
An example of a model satisfying noncontextuality but not Spekkens’ condition is the
following: there are now four types of balls in the box: black and big; black and small;
white and big; white and small. However, (for some physical reason) we can prepare the
box only in such a way that there is exactly as many black and small balls in the box as
there are white and big balls. Consequently, although Spekkens’ condition is violated, we
get as often black balls upon color measurement as big balls upon size measurement.
For an ontological model violating noncontextuality but not Spekkens’ condition we
need to change our non-disturbing operational theory into a disturbing one.20 Thus,
suppose that there are again two types of balls in the box: black and big; white and small.
Performing a basic measurement (color, size) these ontic state invariably provide the
corresponding outcome. However, for joint measurements (color and size) the outcomes
20Since, as we saw in the previous section, in non-disturbing operational theories Spekkens’ condition
implies noncontextuality.
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flip: for the ontic state black and big, for example, the outcome for the joint measurement
will be white and small. The model is contextual but satisfies Spekkens’ condition: the
probability of getting a black ball upon color measurement is the same as the probability of
getting a big ball upon size measurement in each preparation—both equal to the relative
frequency of black and big balls in that preparation.
As the toy models attest, noncontextuality and Spekkens’ condition are different and
logically independent assumptions.
14 Conclusions
In the paper I have argued that a KS argument can rule out a noncontextual value-
definite ontological model for QM in a state-independent way only if the KS graph on
which the argument is based is (i) given a unique realization such that (ii) mutually
commuting operators represent simultaneous measurements. If one abandons (i), then—
since some operators will be realized by multiple measurements—one needs to assume
Spekkens’ condition. By giving up Spekkens’ condition, however, the no-go result can be
blocked. If one abandons (ii), the constraint FUNC on the value assignments cannot be
physically justified. All in all, if noncontextuality is interpreted as the robustness of a
system’s response to a measurement against other simultaneous measurements, then KS
arguments cannot provide an algebraic for proof quantum contextuality.
It is important to note that the main thrust of this negative claim was not to challenge
the view that QM does not admit a noncontextual value-definite ontological model. It
does not. State-dependent arguments (like the GHZ argument) provide a perfect proof to
this effect. The aim of the paper was to challenge the view that KS arguments can prove
this fact in a purely algebraic way based exclusively on measurements and not states (and
in this sense the KS arguments would be stronger than the state-dependent Bell-type
arguments).
But how do we know whether commuting operators represent simultaneous measure-
ments or not? Well, the formalism of QM does not give us a definite answer. One cannot
avoid going back and see what kind of measurements the operators are representing. A
special way to ensure comeasurability (in a somewhat extended meaning) is to perform
the measurements on two or more subsystems of a physical system. These subsystems are
typically spacelike separated parts of a bigger system. In the case of spacelike separated
measurements noncontextuality (12) amounts to a locality requirement, called parameter
independence: measurements performed on a subsystem cannot influence the response
functions of another measurement on a spacelike separated other subsystem.
Noncontextuality as parameter independence plays a crucial role in the Bell-type ar-
guments. In these arguments simultaneous measurability is guaranteed by spacelike sepa-
ration. KS arguments, however, are not designed specifically against locality but against
noncontextuality in general. Therefore, it would be interesting to see whether there exist
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such KS arguments in which simultaneous measurability is not guaranteed by spacelike
separation. Obviously, the most baffling form of contextuality is nonlocality. But it
would be instructive to see whether there are other “softer” versions of contextuality with
no appeal to locality. To uncover such contextuality, one should find a family of simul-
taneous measurements which are performed on the same system (and not on spacelike
separated subsystems) and formulate a KS argument based on these measurements. The
comeasurability of these measurements should then be justified by explicitly identifying
experimental procedures which can be performed on the same system at the same time,
like measuring length and width of a table. Such comeasurability would then not appeal
to locality but would be justified by the detailed physical description of the measurement
processes. Can we come up with a KS argument where comeasurability is grounded in
such a way? Does there exist a “genuine” KS argument with no appeal to locality? I don’t
know the answer.
A similarly open question concerns the lack of KS arguments of type I, where all
sets of commuting operators represent simultaneous measurements (whether realized by
spacelike separation or not). Why are there no arguments providing a state-independent
proof for quantum contextuality? Is there a theoretical reason for their non-existence; or
are they simply not found because they are not looked hard enough (partly due to the
negligence of the difference between commutativity and comeasurability)? Again, I have
no answer.
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